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THE STUDY, ITS RATIONALE AND PLAN
IN A free enterprise economy, such as exists in the United States,
there is a widespread belief in the ability of competition and
the price mechanism to produce efficient finn and market per-
fonnance. However, some industries are subjected to substantial
regulation. This usually occurs when the industry cost structure
precludes reliance upon competition to produce efficient per-
formance; a sufficient number of firms are not expected to sur-
vive in the unregulated environment for competition to ensue.
Hence, price and/or output is subjected to governmental con-
straints.
The commercial banking industry purchases a wide variety
of factor inputs and produces a broad array of products. These
operations are subjected to a heavy framework of regulations;
the rationale being their crucial role in the creation of the
nation's money stock, their central position in business financ-
ing, their control over the transfer mechanism which handles
the vast majority of money payments, and the fact that they
are entrusted with a large fraction of the liquid funds in the
economy. The goals that prompt bank regulations are not nec-
essarily dominated by the desire for efficiency. Even if itis
determined that regulation of banking operations is desirable,
it is necessary to know what effect a regulation or combination
of regulations has on economic efficiency. Such information is
needed because the cost in efficiency of a particular regulation
or set of regulations may be found to be greater than the ex-
pected social benefits;there are possible tradeoffs between
goals and alternative regulations which would be desired; or2 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
the combination of regulations may be altered to achieve the
desired policy goals with a smaller impact on economic efficiency.
When an individual firm operates in a market that is not
perfectly competitive and faces a downward sloping demand
curve, lessis produced and the price is higher than under
perfectly competitive conditions. Because of the relatively small
number of competing banks in most markets, the wide range
of products supplied, and the great potential for differentiating
ostensibly similar products, there is no possibility that bank
markets conform to the, classical description of competitive
markets. However, most banks do operate subject to substantial
competitive pressure from other banks and from other suppliers
of similar services. The degree of competition varies among
markets and even within markets for different products. It is
clear that the products where banks face lower competitive
pressure will have higher prices and less product sales than
would occur if competition were more intense. What is not
clear, however, is the intensity of competition that prevails in
bank markets and the extent of the differences in competitive
vigor between bank markets that are attributable to structural
differences induced by regulations.
Among the set of banking regulations, branching restrictions
are the most pervasively influential in determining the structure
of banking markets. Other regulations, such as restrictions on
entry and restriction on payments for deposits, have a less im-
portant effect on structure. The number of banks in a market
is a positive function and the number of bank offices in a bank
market is a negative function of the degree of branching re-
striction, although there is some question of whether these
functional relationships are linear.' Concentration is negatively
There are three distinct classes of branching restrictions:branching per-
mitted statewide, branching restricted within some partofthestate,and
complete prohibition of branches. The question of linearity arises with respect
to whether the restricted branching states lie between the unit and statewide
branching states with regard to both offices and banks. For a discussion of
the problems of estimating these relationships and the differences in estimates,
se& Donald P. Jacobs, "The Interaction Effects of Restrictions on Branching
and Other Bank Regulations," Journal of Finance, May 1965, pp. 332—348;The Study, Its Rationale and Plan 3
related to the number of banks in the market, and, therefore,
it is also a negative function of the degree of branching re-
striction.
Economic theory suggests that the level of concentration of
an industry's assets influences the competitive condition of the
market but economic theory does not provide an analytical
solution to the relative tradeoff in competitive intensity between
the higher number of offices and the lower number of banks.
Neither does economic theory provide an answer to the ques-
tion of the size of the impact of concentration on price. More-
over, neither economic nor organizational theory provide any
insight into whether differences in the organizational compo-
sition of banks in the market because of branching restrictions
has an impact on the intensity of competition and, therefore,
on prices charged. Thus, the question of the relationship be-
tween market structure and performance can, for the most
part, oniy be answered empirically.
This study attempts to supply an empirical estimate of the
relationship of market structure to the performance of banks
in supplying services to businesses. It aims to provide an an-
swer to the question: What is the relationship between market
structure variables and the price businesses pay banks for
services provided? It should be noted that this is only part of
the larger question of the relationship of market structure to
the performance of banks. But, since the provision of services
to businesses encompasses a major portion of the totality of
services provided by banks, the conclusions will have consider-
able relevance to the larger question.
Chapter 2 is devoted to developing models from which the
parameters of the price-structure relationship can be estimated.
These models must be based upon a description of how banks
price their services to businesses. The procedure istofirst
develop a bank pricing model. The pricing model isthen
Bernard Shull and Paul M. Horvitz, "Branch Banking and Structure of Com-
petition," National Banking Review, March 1964, pp. 301—341; R.F. Lanzillotti
and T.R. Saving, "State Branching Restrictions and the Availability of Branching
Services," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, November 1969, pp. 778—788.4 Business Loan Costs and Bank Market Structure
modified to a form that allows parameter estimates of the
price-structure relationship.
A major implication of the pricing model is that, if maximi-
zation of discounted long-run profits is the goal of bank manage-
ment, prices of individual products will be set to make a profit
on the package of services provided to a customer. The observed
prices of individual products is affected by the package of
services purchased by the customer. A correct specification of
the price of bank services must, therefore, take into account
all products and services contained in the price or prices paid
by a customer.2 Estimating an equation constructed on the
basis of bank customers requires data that represent the entire
profile of a customer's relationship at a bank.
A second important implication of the model is that business
customers compensate banks with three types of payments:
interest on loans, deposit balances, and fees. At this time the
first two of these account for the vast majority of bank coin-
pensation; fees are relatively unimportant. Therefore, both in-
terest rates and deposit balances must be taken into account
in any conclusions about the impact of market structure on
the price businesses pay for bank services.
All prior studies of the price-market structure relationship
in banking specified models that stipulated the interest rate on
loans as the only price, and size of loan and possibly loan term
as the services provided. Data availability was a major reason
behind these model specifications; data describing other custo-
mer characteristics were simply not available.
To develop the data required to estimate the parameters of
the price-structure relationship, a questionnaire was sent to a
sample of over 600 banks with assets between $40 and $400
'The description and analysis of bank pricing practices has prompted a
large volume of research. The hypothesis that bank pricing can be rationalized
if the bank is viewed as establishing a long-term relationship with its business
customers, which is the central theme of the pricing model developed in the
next chapter, was first formulated and analyzed by Donald IL Hodgman in his
pioneering study, Commercial Bank Loan and Investment Policy, Bureau of
Economics and Business Research, University of Illinois, Champaign, 1963.The Study, Its Rationale and Plan 5
million at the end of 1968. Banks in the $40-$60 million asset
class were requested to supply 40 customer profiles; those in
the $80-$ 120 million asset class were asked for 60 customer
profiles; and banks in the $200-$400 million class were asked
for 80 customer profiles. Replies were received from 160 banks
with data covering approximately 8,500 customers.4 The re-
sponding banks include the three classes of branching restric-
tions and have a large variance in market size and measured
concentration of deposits.
The asset size range of banks included in the sample was
chosen with the study in mind. It is believed that if market
structure does influence performance, the relationship would
be most evident and easily measured in the prices paid by
customers in banks of these sizes. The pricing decisions of
smaller banks would be expected to contain such a large amount
of nonsystematic elements that the noise level would make valid
measurement very difficult. On the other hand, larger banks,
because they operate in a national market, have a substantial
portion of their business transactions subjected to competitive
forces outside of their local bank market. Hence, data from
these banks would, in the main, not reflect the local market
conditions that this study attempts to isolate.
In Chapter 3, the parameters of two basic models, one with
loan price and the other with deposit balances as the dependent
variable, are estimated. The main emphasis of the chapter is
on the analysis and interpretation of the parameter estimates
of the structural variables; whether these variables are statis-
tically significant and, if they are, upon their signs and sizes.
This analysis leads to conclusions, in the fourth chapter, about
the quantitative importance of differences in bank market struc-
ture and the direction of influence on the level of bank prices.
'The questionnaire is reproduced as Appendix A.
'The location and class size of responding banks and a description of the
questions and responses to the questionnaire are included in Appendix B.